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Encryption technology allows people using
electronic networks to ensure that the messages
they send remain private—secure from hackers,
industrial espionage, government wiretap abus-
es, and spies. Encryption technology will prove
vital to the future of electronic commerce. For
example, thefts of nuclear secrets from U.S.
national laboratories would be much less likely
if the labs’ commercial software had built-in
encryption features that could be used to limit
unauthorized access—a type of security product
discouraged by export controls.
For years the U.S. government has strug-
gled unsuccessfully to control the export of
encryption technology from this country.
Those ineffectual controls do, however,
adversely affect the competitive position of the
U.S. software industry and national security.
Despite the controls, powerful encryption
products are increasingly available around the
world. Those products include Pretty Good
Privacy, which offers 128-bit encryption, and
many others. This paper provides a list of Web
sites where such products may be found, thus
establishing beyond doubt the futility of con-
trols. Although some of the Web sites may
from time to time disappear, others will spring
up in their place.
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Introduction
According to legend, King Canute’s minis-
ters believed so strongly in royal divine
authority that, to prove them wrong, the wise
monarch marched down to the ocean and
commanded the tide to stop coming in. He
got wet feet and the ministers earned a per-
manent place of honor in the legion of the
ridiculous.
The parallels between Canute’s experi-
ment in applied theology and the U.S. gov-
ernment’s policy on encryption are becoming
more evident each day. As officials try one
approach after another to prevent the spread
of strong encryption, its availability only
grows. Measures announced by the Clinton
administration, which will allow the export
of encryption products of unlimited strength
to subsidiaries of U.S. companies in most
countries and to the banking, insurance,
health care, and electronic commerce sectors
in 42 countries, signify the beginning of the
end for cryptographic export controls.1 It is
time to recognize the inevitability of strong,
nonrecoverable cryptography and take steps
to maximize that technology’s benefits to
society and deal realistically with its less
desirable attributes.
The stated reason for U.S. government
opposition to public access to strong cryp-
tography is to preserve the government’s
ability to gain access to criminal communi-
cations through wiretaps and computer
data files seized as evidence. Such claims
usually invoke a troika of evils—drug deal-
ers, terrorists, and child pornographers—
though decades of wiretapping have not
halted those crimes.
Also, for much of the 20th century the
United States has used intercepted commu-
nications as a primary source of informa-
tion about its adversaries. Cryptoanalytic
breakthroughs were more vital to our victo-
ry in World War II than was the atomic
bomb. The extent to which the United
States is still able to break codes used by
foreign governments and organizations is a
closely held secret. A former Central
Intelligence Agency agent was arrested in
1998 for allegedly revealing information
about broken codes to two foreign govern-
ments, but press reports indicate that his
job was to break into foreign government
offices to steal cryptographic keys. Wide-
spread commercial use of strong cryptogra-
phy may hasten the inevitable loss of such
intelligence sources, to the extent they are
still flowing. In addition, the United States
no doubt derives valuable intelligence by
analyzing vast quantities of unencrypted
communications, a benefit that some
observers believe could be preserved by
guaranteeing government access to the keys
to encrypted communications. However,
code breaking is most useful when the par-
ties using the code do not realize that their
code has been compromised. Since “back
doors” built into crypto products because
of legal requirements would be public
knowledge, they would have limited use in
signals intelligence.2
Cryptographic technology is so wide-
spread that it is impossible to stop. If any
major governments, terrorist organizations,
or drug cartels are not now using strong cryp-
tography, it is not because of lack of avail-
ability or lack of reliable suppliers. There are
many firms overseas that are willing to pro-
vide cryptographic software, and, for better
or for worse, some of the cryptographic prod-
ucts most widely available on the interna-
tional market were originally made in the
United States. This paper outlines the avail-
ability of strong crypto abroad, underscoring
the futility of export controls.
Strong Cryptography
Cryptography is the ancient art and sci-
ence of transforming information so that it
is no longer intelligible to the uninitiated
but can be read by those in possession of
some special knowledge.3 That knowledge
usually takes the form of a decryption key.
Strong encryption performs transforma-
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tions using methods that are believed to be
impenetrable to anyone not possessing the
decryption key.
To be considered strong, any crypto-
graphic system (for computers or pen and
ink) must be shown to be free of mathe-
matical weaknesses that make it possible to
break.4 In addition, the decryption keys
must have sufficient variability to make try-
ing all key combinations (a “brute force”
attack) impractical. 
Computers perform complicated mathe-
matical transformations and brute force
attacks much more quickly than unaided
humans or vintage machines like the
Enigma.5 Today computers are almost
always used to perform encryption and
decryption. But strong methods of encryp-
tion can be and have been developed and
used without the aid of computers,6 as they
were in Thomas Jefferson’s day; the process
is just more cumbersome.
There are two types of encryption sys-
tems for computer systems in use today.
Conventional, or symmetric, encryption
uses the same key for encryption and
decryption. A symmetric key is a string of
random bits; the key’s variability and
strength are measured simply by the num-
ber of random bits in it.7Cryptographers
recommend that, to be reasonably secure,
keys should be at least 90 bits long.8 The
world standard is 128 bits because that is a
convenient size for computers. There is no
technical reason to use shorter keys.9
The second type of encryption, public-
key or asymmetric systems, uses separate
keys for encryption and decryption: the pri-
vate key and the public key. The private key
must always remain secret. The public key is
derived from the private key by using a
mathematical formula that makes deriving
the private key extremely difficult. For
example, if two large prime numbers are
multiplied together, it is very hard to
reverse the operation to deduce the prime
numbers if one is given only the product to
work from. Public keys must be long
enough that known methods of reversing
the operations used to derive them from
the private keys fail by a sufficient safety
margin. RSA Data Security, Inc., a sub-
sidiary of Security Dynamics Technologies,
Inc., holder of the patents on cryptography
based on multiplying large prime numbers,
recommends this type of key be at least
1024 bits long for moderate security and
2048 bits for high security. The U.S. Bureau
of Export Administration (known as BXA)
considers encryption systems with symmet-
ric keys that are more than 56 bits long or
asymmetric keys longer than 1024 bits
strong and subjects them to export con-
trols. Although exports to some industries
in some countries have been liberalized, a
vast array of encryption products is still
encumbered by export controls. 
Impact of Strong
Cryptography Controls
Export restrictions have delayed the
introduction of electronic commerce and
weakened the position of the U.S. software
industry in comparison with its overseas
competition. The Economic Strategy
Institute issued a report estimating losses
to the U.S. economy due to encryption
export restrictions at between $37 billion
and $96 billion over the next five years.10
The recent sectoral relief does nothing to
allow U.S. companies to develop encryption
products for the great mass of communica-
tions, such as email or telephony.1 1
Restrictions continue to discourage the
integration of encryption into operating
systems and computer chips. Without such
integration, effective computer security is
almost impossible to achieve. 
Encryption export restrictions also
adversely affect U.S. national security.
Recently, Los Alamos National Laboratory
shut down the entire classified computer
network used to design and validate nuclear
weapons because it was so insecure.
Allegations of theft of atomic weapons
secrets from Los Alamos12 have prompted
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calls for tightening export controls. Yet
there is a strong case to be made that U.S.
export controls on cryptography con-
tributed to those problems.
Encryption is at the heart of all comput-
er security schemes. Fear of export regula-
tions has led mass-market software vendors
to simply ignore security. A major reason
our national nuclear weapons labs cannot
protect restricted data from theft by insid-
ers is that their computers use commercial
operating systems. Those operating sys-
tems lack the fine-grained transfer controls
needed to enforce security policies covering
authorized users.
The reason such tools do not exist in
commercial operating systems is not an
absence of market demand—many indus-
tries have a need for such capabilities—but
the fact that such tools require strong cryp-
tography and therefore would subject the
operating systems that contain them to
export controls. Since our commercial soft-
ware industry depends on export revenue,
firms won’t develop those features, and the
government does not have the ability to
develop the tools on its own. Thus, as a
result of decades of restrictions on cryptog-
raphy, not only our national labs but every
sector of American society is wide open to
insider espionage.
Key Recovery
Encryption export controls were also
designed to provide leverage for the govern-
ment to foist “key recovery” on an unwill-
ing market. Key recovery, or key escrow,
encryption provides the government with a
mechanism for recovering a decrypted mes-
sage without the knowledge of the informa-
tion’s owner or intended recipients. For
example, the government might require the
deposit of all private keys in “escrow” with a
third party; police desiring access to the
contents of the message could then
approach the third party without notifying
the key’s owner. The administration’s new
encryption policy will permit the export of
key recovery products under general license
after one-time review. There are several
problems with that approach.
First, key recovery is cumbersome and
expensive. One significant reason is technical
problems with rapid access to the decrypted
content.1 3 Even U.S. government agencies
resist using key recovery and prefer non-
escrow products.1 4 For many applications,
there is no need for key recovery features
except to meet the demands of law enforce-
ment. Thus there is limited market demand
for key recovery systems for stored informa-
tion—and none for key recovery systems for
real-time communications like phone calls.
Key recovery systems will be unable to com-
pete with cheaper nonescrow alternatives.
Second, any attempt to restrict crypto-
graphic technology that does not support
key recovery—domestic or international—
will violate the First Amendment. For
example, export controls amount to a prior
restraint on professors of mathematics who
want to present their ideas about cryptog-
raphy to foreign students or to colleagues
in foreign countries.1 5
Third, key recovery will create new targets
for miscreants to attack. Given the enormous
value that the data in key repositories repre-
sents, it is only a matter of time before they
will be compromised. Even the best security
arrangements are vulnerable to bribes, black-
mail, and threats of bodily harm. Over time,
commitment to security will wither under
cost pressures and boredom. Some key recov-
ery systems do not rely on key depositories.
Rather, they use another key to encrypt the
private key to every communication and
attach it to the message itself. The key used to
encrypt all the private keys then becomes the
focus of attacks and bribery.
The Cryptographic Cat Is
Out of the Bag
Many of the arguments about strong
cryptography turn on judgment calls or bal-
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ancing—for example, when, if ever, does the
threat of the use of encryption by criminals
justify sacrifices of constitutional guarantees
of liberty? But it is a simple matter of fact
that export controls are futile because strong
cryptography is already widely available to
the general public, and to the “bad guys” as
well.1 6Why would drug dealers, for example,
who now run private airlines, bribe judges,
assassinate opponents, subvert armies, and
even help elect national leaders, be deterred
from obtaining widely available crypto-
graphic software? 
Today, anyone anywhere in the world
Adam Back’s home page with crypto links
http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/
Adam Back’s RSA “munitions” T-Shirt
homepage
http://www.obscura.com/~shirt/
Bibliography of Quantum Cryptography
Steganography bibliography, workshop,
mailing list
http://www.cs.mcgill.ca/~crepeau/CRYP
TO/Biblio-QC.html
CipherSaber Home Page
http://www.ciphersaber.gurus.com/
Cryptography A-2-Z
http://www.ssh.fi/tech/crypto/
Cypherpunks Tonga
http://www.cypherpunks.to/
The Data Encryption Page
http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/
Network/ 2811/
EFF “Privacy, Security, Crypto,
Surveillance” Archive
http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/
Fortify
http://www.fortify.net/
Free Crypto.org
http://www.freecrypto.org/
Mozilla Crupto Group
http://www.mozilla-crypto.ssleay.org/
index.php/
Netsurfer Focus on Cryptography and
Privacy
http://www.netsurf.com/nsf/v01/03/nsf.0
1.03.html
PGP and Anonymous Remailers made
Simple using Windows 
http://home.earthlink.net/~rjswan/pgp/
Ron Rivest’s Cryptography and Security
collection
http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/cryptose-
curity.html
Ron Rivest’s home page with publica-
tions and links
http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/
RPK public key cryptosystem page
http://www.rpkusa.com/
RSAEuro
http://www.repertech.com/RSAEuro/
Software Publishers Association report
on availability of crypto overseas
http://www.eff.org/pub/Crypto/ITAR_ex
port/non-us_crypto_spa.report
Thawte Digital Certificate Services
http://www.thawte.com/
Where to Find Strong Crypto Online
http://www.jya.com/crypto_table.html
Links to Strong Encryption
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with access to the Internet can download
Pretty Good Privacy, as well as foreign cryp-
tographic products.17 PGP was originally
written by Phil Zimmermann, who com-
bined several widely known cryptographic
algorithms to create a practical crypto-
graphic system for protecting electronic
mail and computer files. An unknown per-
son posted PGP to the Internet, and PGP
quickly spread throughout the world. The
government subjected Zimmermann to a
lengthy investigation for possibly violating
U.S. export laws but never indicted him,
apparently because it could not determine
who actually exported the software.
In December 1998 the United States
pressured the 33 member countries of the
Wassenaar Arrangement, which limits and
tracks the export of arms and “dual-use”
goods (encryption technology is listed
under this category) from country to coun-
try, to place controls on encryption prod-
ucts with keys over 64 bits. Sweden, for
example, was reportedly threatened with
trade sanctions to get it to sign the agree-
ment.1 8But the Wassenaar signatories have
wide discretion as to how to implement the
controls, and some will elect not to enforce
them. Finland, Ireland, Canada, and
Germany have announced support for liberal
export regimes.1 9France recently dropped its
restrictions on domestic encryption up to
128 bits.2 0 Support in the United Kingdom
for mandatory key escrow has rapidly evap-
orated.2 1This leaves citizens of almost every
country around the world free to use strong
crypto domestically—they simply will not
buy it from the United States. Some crypto-
exporting nations, such as South Africa and
Israel, are not Wassenaar signatories.2 2 In
June 1999 Germany, a Wassenaar signatory,
announced its intention to support strong
encryption for domestic use and for inter-
national export.2 3 Countries around the
world will see the futility of trying to con-
trol the export of strong encryption and
respond to strong incentives to help their
national companies compete more effec-
tively in the world market.
Conclusion
Years of debate about the justifications
for export controls have supplied many rea-
sons to think that encryption export con-
trols are costly and unconstitutional—and
some sophisticated counterarguments.
Commentators new to the debate may find
themselves endlessly reviving points the
discussion has long since moved past. But
the simple reality that strong encryption is
widely available around the globe can res-
cue us from endless debate. The security
benefits of strong privacy will be available
to everyone; law enforcement can and will
adapt. It is time to move forward.
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